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wherein the Court held that a defendant who is not apprised of the
risks of joint representation may withdraw a guilty plea only if he
can demonstrate a significant possibility of a conflict of interest.
Notably, the Court emphasized that although courts must conduct
an inquiry when there is joint representation, the failure to do so
will not result in reversal of a conviction subsequent to a plea bargaining agreement unless a conflict of interest is shown.
It is hoped that the discussion of these and other significant
cases will help keep the practitioner aware of developments in New
York law.

CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES

Article 41-Trial by a Jury
CPLR 4111: Retrial necessary in cases involving multiple theories
of liability when general verdict is used and one or more theories
are unsupported by evidence
CPLR 4111 provides that a trial judge, in his discretion, "may
direct the jury to find either a general verdict or a special verdict."' If ordered to render a special verdict, the jury must decide
1 CPLR 4111(a) (1963). This provision replaced sections 458 and 459 of the Civil Practice Act and is based upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED.R. Civ. P. 49. The
discretionary power of trial courts to select either a general verdict or a special verdict has
been established in New York law since 1934. Ch. 552, [1934] N.Y. LAws 1195; see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Artkraft Strauss Sign Corp., 45 App. Div. 2d 482, 483, 359 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (lst
Dep't 1974). See generally WK&M 4111.04.
In instructing a jury to render a general verdict, a trial judge may require that written
answers to written interrogatories on one or more issues of fact be returned. See CPLR
4111(c) (1963). Formerly, the written answers to such written interrogatories were termed
"special findings," see ch. 552, [1934] N.Y. LAws 1195, but the term was changed to its
present form to avoid confusion with "special verdicts." See generally Anderson v. Anderson, 103 Misc. 427, 170 N.Y.S. 612 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1918). Such a qualified general
verdict "clarifies the jury's constituent findings" and "enables the jury to draw the conclusions they believe the findings justify." SiEGEL § 399, at 523. The special verdict and the
general verdict accompanied by interrogatories have been recognized by the judiciary as
providing essentially the same factual advantages and, as a result, have been referred to
interchangeably. See, e.g., Forman v. Davidson, 74 App. Div. 2d 505, 506, 424 N.Y.S.2d 711,
712 (1st Dep't 1980); Killeen v. Reinhardt, 71 App. Div. 2d 851, 853, 419 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178
(2d Dep't 1979); Brandt v. Warren Automatic Controls Corp., 37 App. Div. 2d 563, 563, 322
N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (2d Dep't 1971); Dore v. Long Island R.R., 23 App. Div. 2d 502, 502, 256
N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d Dep't 1965); Hartnett v. Home Life Ins. Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 281, 284,
239 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (4th Dep't 1963). For purposes of this analysis, therefore, the general
verdict accompanied by interrogatories will be treated as a special verdict.
As with most judicial matters of discretion, the trial court's choice of the type of verdict
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specific issues presented to it by the court without making any
general determination as to liability.2 Conversely, a general verdict
requires the jury to fix the rights and liabilities of the litigants
without making specific findings.' In cases involving alternative
theories of liability, a defect in any one of these bases for recovery
will render a general verdict dubious, because an appellate court
will be unable to ascertain whether the jury's decision had been
based upon a defective theory.4 Recently, in Davis v. Caldwell,5 the
is not disturbed, absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Lagzdins v. United
Welfare Fund-Sec. Div. Marriott Corp., 77 App. Div. 2d 585, 586, 430 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353
(2d Dep't 1980); Quigley v. County of Suffolk, 75 App. Div. 2d 888, 889, 428 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47
(2d Dep't 1980).
2 CPLR 4111(b) (1963); see Alton, Special Verdicts In the State Courts,27 INs. CoUNs.
J. 390, 390 (1960); Note, Trial Procedure-TheSpecial Verdict in Civil Cases, 48 Ky. L.J.
440, 440 (1960). Since the trial judge applies the appropriate principles of law when a special
verdict is used, the jury need only be instructed to the extent necessary for it to determine
each factual issue presented. See McBride, Instructions in Special Verdict Cases, 59 Ohio
Op. 381, 385 (1956). The special verdict also requires the framing of appropriate questions
for jury submission, a task for which counsel is usually sought. See 4 WK&M %4111.09.
When the response to the questions submitted to a jury are inconsistent, the court may
either resubmit the questions for further jury deliberation or order a new trial. See Nallan v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 67 App. Div. 2d 719, 721, 412 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (2d Dep't 1979), rev'd
on other grounds, 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1980). Similarly, when
a general verdict is used in conjunction with interrogatories and the answers are consistent
with each other but not with the verdict, the court is required to direct judgment according
to the answers, direct further deliberations, or order a new trial. See Oakley v. City of Rochester, 71 App. Div. 2d 15, 17, 421 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (4th Dep't 1979); Bruto v. George Herman & Assoc., Inc., 64 App. Div. 2d 844, 845, 407 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333-34 (4th Dep't 1978),
aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 941, 393 N.E.2d 1042, 419 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1979); CPLR 4111(c) (1963). If the
answers are inconsistent with the verdict and conflict among themselves, the court is not
permitted to direct the verdict, but must direct the jury to deliberate further or order a new
trial. See Marine Midland Bank v. John E. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 40, 405 N.E.2d
205, 209-10, 427 N.Y.S.2d 961, 966 (1980); SIEGEL § 399, at 523-24.
3 The CPLR defines a general verdict as "one in which the jury finds in favor of one or
more parties." CPLR 4111(a) (1963). Since the general verdict disposes of the legal and
factual issues in a case, the jury must be instructed as to the appropriate legal principles to
be applied to the facts at trial. Indeed, a failure to instruct the jury sufficiently may result in
an order for a new trial. Cf. Johnson v. Artkraft Strauss Sign Corp., 45 App. Div. 2d 482,
483-84, 359 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774-75 (1st Dep't 1974) (failure to instruct the jury as to the
appropriate standard of care); Jasinski v. New York Cent. R.R., 21 App. Div. 2d 456, 461-62,
250 N.Y.S.2d 942, 947-48 (4th Dep't 1964) (failure to instruct the jury as to the "last clear
chance doctrine"). This aspect of general verdicts has been criticized because it assumes
that the jury is able to understand the principles of law presented and then apply them to
the facts of the case. See Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 25960 (1920). But see 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTI E 38.02 (2d ed. 1981) (extolling the value
of the jury in general).
4 See, e.g., Gurney, Becker & Bourne, Inc. v. Benderson Dev. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 995, 996,
394 N.E.2d 282, 283, 420 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213-14 (1979); Killeen v. Reinhardt, 71 App. Div. 2d
851, 853, 419 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177 (2d Dep't 1979); Mulligan v. Shuter, 71 App. Div. 2d 669,
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Court of Appeals held that a new trial is required in cases involving multiple theories of liability when a general verdict is used and
any one of the theories is found to be unsupported by the
evidence.'
In Davis, the plaintiff underwent a mastectomy, thinking that
such an operation was necessary to remove a suspected cancerous
condition.' After learning that the tissue was benign," the plaintiff
sued her surgeon and the hospital in which the operation was performed, alleging five separate acts of medical malpractice." After
receiving the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury to resolve
the issues pertaining to each of the five theories of liability, 0 but
to return a single general verdict only."' The jury found for the
plaintiff, awarding a substantial sum in money damages. 2 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed without opinion,""
and the defendants appealed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed,' 4 holding that there5
was insufficient evidence to support two of the five theories.
669, 419 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (2d Dep't 1979); Ferrarra v. Levanthal, 56 App. Div. 2d 490, 498,
392 N.Y.S.2d 920, 925 (2d Dep't 1977); Ward v. Kovacs, 55 App. Div. 2d 391, 395, 390
N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (2d Dep't 1977); Hamilton v. Presbyterian Hosp., 25 App. Div. 2d 431,
431, 267 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam); Dore v. Long Island R.R., 23 App.
Div. 2d 502, 502, 256 N.Y.S.2d 425, 426 (2d Dep't 1965); Jasinski v. New York Cent. R.R., 21
App. Div. 2d 456, 462, 250 N.Y.S.2d 942, 948 (4th Dep't 1964); Hartnett v. Home Life Ins.
Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 281, 284, 239 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (4th Dep't 1963).
54 N.Y.2d 176, 429 N.E.2d 741, 445 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981).
6 Id. at 183-84, 429 N.E.2d at 745, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
Id. at 178, 429 N.E.2d at 742, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
8 Id. at 178-79, 429 N.E.2d at 742, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 64. Postoperative pathological and
x-ray studies, performed on a limited portion of the tissue removed, indicated that a malignancy was not present. Id.
Id. at 179, 429 N.E.2d at 742, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 64. Although the trial court referred to
the plaintiff's five claims as "causes of action," the Court of Appeals labeled them "theories
of liability." Id. at 179 & n.2, 429 N.E.2d at 743 & n.2, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 65 & n.2.
-0Id. at 179, 429 N.E.2d at 743, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 65. The five theories of liability comprising the plaintiff's case were erroneous diagnosis, failure to perform a biopsy prior to
surgery, unnecessary performance of an operation, failure to follow accepted community
standards of medical care, and failure to obtain informed consent prior to surgery. 54
N.Y.2d at 179, 429 N.E.2d at 742-43, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 64-65.
" 54 N.Y.2d at 179, 429 N.E.2d at 743, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 65. The jury was instructed
that although a finding for the plaintiff on any one of the claims would permit an award of
damages, they were not to reveal the claim or claims upon which they based the award. Id.
12 Id.
" Davis v. Caldwell, 79 App. Div. 2d 1088, 437 N.Y.S.2d 952 (4th Dep't 1981).
14 54 N.Y.2d at 184, 429 N.E.2d at 745, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 67. Judge Jones authored the
unanimous opinion. Id.
15Id. at 178, 429 N.E.2d at 742, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 64. The Court observed that the record
did not contain any evidence that the plaintiff's doctor "ever made a diagnosis or was ever
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Moreover, the Court found that a new trial was necessary because
there was no means to ascertain whether the finding of liability
had been predicated upon one of these unsubstantiated grounds
for recovery.16 The Court suggested, however, that "[s]ignificantly
different legal consequences" would have obtained if the trial judge
had not presented the case as involving five separate theories of
recovery, but had marshalled the plaintiff's evidence so as to permit a finding that the defendants had breached a general standard
of care.'"
The use of general verdicts in cases involving multiple theories
of liability often has been problematical. Indeed, New York courts
consistently have held that the use of a general verdict is erroneous
in such cases 8 and that the special verdict is a more appropriate
procedural tool when multiple theories are asserted. 19 The Davis
Court appears to have offered a solution to the problems posed by
general verdicts in negligence cases by observing that the need for
a retrial can be obviated through an alternative method of presentcalled upon to do so." Id. at 180, 429 N.E.2d at 743, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 65. Thus, the Court
reasoned that the plaintiff's theory predicated upon misdiagnosis never should have been
submitted to the jury. Id. at 181, 429 N.E.2d at 744, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 66. Similarly, the Court
found that no evidence supported the plaintiff's claim that the operation was unnecessary.
Id.
Is Id. at 179-80, 429 N.E.2d at 743, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 65. The Court stated that "[a]t the
new trial, the jury may not consider the two theories of liability for which the evidence was
insufficient on the first trial but may consider those theories as to which sufficient evidence
was introduced at the previous trial to have warranted a verdict favorable to plaintiffs." Id.
at 180, 429 N.E.2d at 743, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (citation and footnote omitted).
17 Id. at 180 n.4, 429 N.E.2d at 743 n.4, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 65 n.4 (citing Food Pageant,
Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 429 N.E.2d 738, 445 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1981)).
18 See, e.g., Lagzdins v. United Welfare Fund-Sec. Div. Marriott Corp., 77 App. Div. 2d
585, 586, 430 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (2d Dep't 1980); Quigley v. County of Suffolk, 75 App. Div.
2d 888, 889, 428 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (2d Dep't 1980). See also Fein v. Board of Educ., 305 N.Y.
611, 613, 111 N.E.2d 732, 733 (1953) (per curiam); Frozzitta v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, 57 App. Div. 2d 827, 827, 394 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65 (2d Dep't 1977); Hartnett v. Home Life
Ins. Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 281, 284, 239 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (4th Dep't 1963).
19 See, e.g., Forman v. Davidson, 74 App. Div. 2d 505, 506, 424 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (1st
Dep't 1980); Killeen v. Reinhardt, 71 App. Div. 2d 851, 853, 419 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (2d Dep't
1979); Brandt Corp. v. Warren Automatic Controls Corp., 37 App. Div. 2d 563, 563, 322
N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (2d Dep't 1971); Corbett v. Brown, 32 App. Div. 2d 27, 32, 299 N.Y.S.2d
219, 224 (3d Dep't 1969); M.W. Zack Metal Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 1109,
1110, 284 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (1st Dep't 1967) (per curiam); Finkle v. Zimmerman, 26 App.
Div. 2d 179, 181, 271 N.Y.S.2d 820, 822 (3d Dep't 1966); Dore v. Long Island R.R., 23 App.
Div. 2d 502, 502, 256 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (2d Dep't 1965); Coastal Commercial Corp. v. Samuel Kosoff & Sons, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 372, 378, 199 N.Y.S.2d 852, 858 (4th Dep't 1960);
Martin Fireproofing Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 45 Misc. 2d 354, 360, 257 N.Y.S.2d
100, 106-07 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 910, 275 N.Y.S.2d 375 (4th
Dep't 1966).
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ing the plaintiff's case to the jury. It is submitted, however, that
the Davis Court's suggestion bears little practical significance. Although the explicit factual determinations revealed through special
verdicts are rendered unnecessary when the plaintiff's evidentiary
contentions are presented to the jury under a single theory of negligence,2 0 it appears that this "marshalling" approach will not be
available in cases implicating discrete theories, such as strict products liability, breach of warranty, and intentional tort.
Notwithstanding that the alternative evidentiary presentation
suggested in Davis may permit the use of general verdicts in cases
limited to negligence theories, trial judges nevertheless should consider the collateral benefits offered by special verdicts. Indeed, the
special verdict will be preferable in many instances since it focuses
the jury's attention on precise factual questions 21 and diminishes
the possibility of jury bias2 2 by requiring the trial court to draw the
legal conclusions dispositive of the case.2 3 Additionally, the special
20 See Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 174-75, 429
N.E.2d 738, 741, 445 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (1981); cf. Elfeld v. Burkham Auto Renting Co., 299
N.Y. 336, 342, 87 N.E.2d 285, 288 (1949) (material factual determinations implicitly are
found in favor of party who prevails through general verdict). In FoodPageant,the plaintiff
brought suit to recover damages sustained when the defendant's electrical power system
failed. 54 N.Y.2d at 170, 429 N.E.2d at 739, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 61. The plaintiff alleged that
the blackout was caused by the defendant's failure to maintain and inspect equipment properly, its negligent placement of unqualified personnel in critical positions, and its failure to
keep several power sources in operable condition. Id. at 171, 429 N.E.2d at 739, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 61. A general verdict was rendered in the plaintiff's favor, and the appellate
division affirmed. Id. at 172, 429 N.E.2d at 740, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
Refusing to reverse the judgment, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's contention that "[b]ecause not all of [the plaintiff's] discrete 'theories of liability' . . . were...
supported by legally sufficient evidence, the rendering of a general verdict require[d] a new
trial." Id. at 174, 429 N.E.2d at 741, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 63. Examining the record, the Court
observed that the trial judge did not present the case to the jury by focusing upon distinct
theories of recovery. Id. at 175, 429 N.E.2d at 741, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 63.- Rather, the Court
noted, the jury was given "a summary of [the] plaintiff's evidentiary contentions," and was
told to decide whether the defendant's conduct rose to the level of gross negligence. Id. The
Court concluded that this method of presentation was not erroneous, and the jury's verdict
was supported by the evidence. Id.
21 See, e.g., Wilson v. Homestead Valve Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 792, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 916 (1955); Pache v. Boehm, 60 App. Div. 2d 867, 867-68, 401
N.Y.S.2d 260, 261-62 (2d Dep't 1978); cf. CPLR 4111(b) (1963) (court must submit questions "susceptible of brief answer" when directing jury to render special verdict). See generally 4 WK&M 1 4111.05.
11 Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
816 (1948); see, e.g., Cartagena v. P. & F. Trucking, Inc., 73 App. Div. 2d 490, 493-94, 426
N.Y.S.2d 486, 488 (1st Dep't 1980).
2' See CPLR 4111(a) (1963) (when special verdict is used, court decides which party is
entitled to judgment). When a special verdict is used, the court instructs the jury with re-
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verdict aids subsequent review by presenting an explicit adjudication of each issue to an appellate court reviewing the merits 24 or
another trial court considering the collateral estoppel effect of the
judgment. 25 Finally, such verdicts appear to satisfy automatically
the statutory requirements that elements of damages be itemized
in medical malpractice awards 26 and that fault be apportioned
27
among multiple tortfeasors in other negligence actions.
Gerard A. Hefner

DoMiSTIc RELATIONS LAW

Visitation of adopted child by natural grandparents properly
may be sought under DRL § 72
Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law accords grandparents a procedure to secure visitation with a minor grandchild when
"either or both of the parents of a minor child . . . isor are deceased."2 8 Once a child is adopted, however, the legal relationship
spect to the law only to the degree reasonably necessary to answer the questions presented.
See note 2 supra. In such cases, the jury is less able to predict the legal effect of its factual
conclusions. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 816 (1948).
24 See, e.g., Quigley v. County of Suffolk, 75 App. Div. 2d 888, 889, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 46, 47
(2d Dep't 1980); notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra. The factual determinations
rendered incident to special verdicts are readily available to appellate courts since the clerk
of the court must "make an entry in his minutes specifying ... the general verdict and any
answers to written interrogatories, or the questions and answers or other written findings
constituting the special verdict." CPLR 4112 (1963).
28 See generally CPLR 4111(d), commentary at 95-96 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
26 See CPLR 4111(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Subsection (d)requires that a verdict in a medical malpractice action "specify the applicable elements of special and general
damages upon which the award is based and the amount assigned to each element." Id.
'7 See, e.g., Noga v. Monroe Medi-Trans, 78 App. Div. 2d 988, 988, 433 N.Y.S.2d 927,
928 (4th Dep't 1980); SmaGEL § 399, at 522; 4 WK&M 1 4111.05, at 41-195 to 41-196. See
generally CPLR 1401-04, 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
" DRL § 72 (1977) (original version at ch. 631, § 1 [1966] N.Y. Laws 1391, amended by
ch. 431, § 1 [1975] N.Y. Laws 620 (McKinney)); see Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522,
526-27, 355 N.E.2d 372, 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 412, 414-15, alf'd on remand, 54 App. Div. 2d
582, 387 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't 1976). Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law provides:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within this
state, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show that conditions exist which
equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of such child
may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child
brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after
due notice to the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody,

